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[L. A. No. 25143. In Bank. Jan. 26,1960.]

PETRI CLEANERS, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, v.
AUTOMOTIVE EMPLOYEES, LAUNDRY DRIVERS
AND HELPERS LOCAL NUMBER 88, Appellant.

J' .

.

[1] Labor-Legislation Governing: Strikes.-Where an employer
is not engaged in interstate commerce and there is a dispute
between a labor nnion and an independent association of employees as to which organization shall be the exclusive bargaining agent of the employer's employees, the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197) is not applicable;
the governing statute is the Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab.
Code, § 1115 et seq.)
[2] Id.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-The issue
whether an independent association of employees was a ''labor
organization" within the meaning of the Jurisdictional Strike
Act did not become moot by virtue of the one-year limitation
in Lab. Code, § 1117, that limitation being measured from the
date "of the commencement of any proceeding brought under
this chapter [chap. 7, relating to jurisdictional strikes],"
which means from the date the complaint is filed (Code Civ.
Proc., §S50), where all the facts bearing on the association's
independence took place within seven months prior to filing
the complaint.
[8] Id.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-If an association of employees was "interfered with, dominated or controlled" by the employer, it was not a ''labor organization"
within the meaning of Lab. Code, § 1117, and there was DO
jurisdictional strike, within the meaning of § 1118, where

[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Labor, §§ 12, 107, 120 et seq.
HeX. Dig. References: [1] Labor, §§ la, 21; [2-6,8] Labor, § 21;
[7] Labor, § 18; [9, 10] Labor, § 3a.
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another labor union maintained a strike for recognition
against such el:lployer.
Id. - Jurisdictional Strikes - Labor Organizations.-Federal
decisions construing the Labor Management Relations Act,
§ 8(a) (1) and (2), are persuasive in interpreting Lab. Code,
§ 1117, defining "labor organization," since the language and
policy of the two acts are similar.
Id.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-Activities
that constitute interference with a union include manifestations by the employer that he favors one union over the other,
interrogation of employees as to their union sympathies, especially when coupled with threats of discharge for supporting
the outside union or promises of economic benefits for remaining loyal to the company, solicitation by management of union
withdrawal letters, unequal advantages conferred on the inside
union that are denied to the outside union, such as use of
company time and property, and hasty recognition of the inside union, as contrasted with marked reluctance to recognize
the outside union.
Id.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-Undisputed\
evidence established as a matter of law that an employer seeking to enjoin a union of laundry drivers from picketing or
otherwise interfering with the employer's business "interfered
with" an independent association of employees so as to preclude such association from being a "labor organization"
within the meaning of the Jurisdictional Strike Act where the
employer's president and plant manager conducted coercive
interrogations, giving several drivers the "choice" of renouncing union membership or being discharged, where the
employer provided its drivers with a prepared letter of withdrawal from the union and initially discharged two drivers
who refused to withdraw, where the employer repeatedly announced that it would not bargain with the union, at the same
time encouraging the formation of the association through
assurances that the inside group enjoyed the employer's complete approval, and where the employer permitted the association to use its property and bulletin board at all meetings following the organizational meeting-a privilege it did not extend to the union.
Id.-Labor Unions-Closed or Union Shop Contracts.-Lab.
Code, § 921, providing that promises embodied in yellow-dog
contracts shall not be enforced, § 922, providing that any
person who coerces another to enter into such a contract as a
condition of employment is guilty of a misdemeanor, and § 923,
announcing it to be the public policy of the state "to uphold
the freedom of employees to organize and enter into collective
bargaining contracts for their own protection," do not preclude
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promises to join independent labor organizations, closed or
union shop contract~, or concerted activities to obtain such
contracts, and they do not place on the employer an affirmative
duty to bargain. An employer faced with a union's demand
for recognition still has the choice of yielding to the union's
demands or continuing to endure the interference with its
business relations which the union's activities caused.
[8] ld.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Purpose and Effect of Statute.The Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120, 1122)
was designed, not to diminish free competition between labor
and industry, but to release an innocent employer caught between the rival claims of two or more labor organilmtions. It
does not apply unless there are at least two ''labor or/!anizations" within the meaning of § 1117, and the prohibited activity arises out of a dispute between them as to which has the
exclusive right to bargain with an employer or to have its
members work for him. The employer may not only enjoin a
jurisdictional strike (Lab. Code, § 1116), but refuse to bargain
with either organization.
[9] ld.-Collective Bargaining Contracts.-It is for the Legisla'
ture to determine whether voluntary bargaining should be displaced by a rule compelling the employer to bargain with the
representatives of a majority of his employees. The Supreme
Court cannot usurp legislative power by enacting rules of law
patterned on the Labor Management Relations Act, and it cannot create the administrative machinery necessary to make
sueh rules workable.
[10] ld.-Collective Bargaining Contracts.-Employers are not required by law to engllg:e in collective bargaining and closed
or union shop agreements and concerted activities to achieve
them are lawful "..hether or not a majority of the employees
directly involved wish such agreements. (Overruling Garmon v.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Ca1.2d 595 [320 P.2d 473] ;
Retail Clerh' Union v. Superior Court, 52Cn1.2d 222 [339 P.2d
839], and disapproving Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Ca1.2d 162 [339
P.2d 801] insofar as inconsistent with views expressed in this
case.)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granting and denying injunctive relief. Harry
M. Hunt, Judge pro tem.· Order granting injunctive relief,
reversed j order denying injunctive relief, affirmed.
Stevenson & Hackler, Stevenson, Hackler & Ansell and Herbert M. Ansell for Appellant.
• Appointed pursuant to stipUlation, see Const., art. VI,
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Rutan, Lindsay, Dahl, Smedegaard, Howell & Tucker,
Milford W. Dahl, W. W. McCray, Severson, Zang, Werson,
Berke & Larson and Nathan R. Berke for Respondent.
Br()nson, Bronson & McKinnon and Charles A. Rummel as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
TRAYNOR. J.-Defendant Automotive Employees, Laundry Drivers and Helpers Local Number 88 (hereinafter referred to as defendant) appeals from two orders of the trial
court. One granted plaintiff's motion under the Jurisdictional
Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120, 1122) for a preliminary
injunction against defendant's strike for recognition; the other
denied defendant's motion for a preliminary injunction to
compel plaintiff to bargain with defendant instead of the
Independent Association of Petri Employees (hereinafter
called the Association), an alleged company union.
[1] Since plaintiff is not engaged in interstate co~rce,
the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197
(1947») is not applicable. The governing statute is the Jurisdictional Strike Act. Plaintiff contends that there is a labor
dispute between defendant and the Association as to which
organization shall be the exclusive bargaining agent of plaintiff's employees and defendant's picketing therefore violates
the act. Defendant contends that there has been no violation
on the ground that the Association is not a labor organization
within the meaning of the act.
[2 ] This issue has not become moot by the passage of time.
Although plaintiff urges that if the matter had proceeded to
trial on the permanent injunction, facts relating to the formation of the Association would have been irrelevant because
of the one-year limitation in section 1117, that limitation is
measured from the date "of the commencement of any proceeding brought under this chapter. " An action is commenced
when the complaint is filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 350.) Plaintiff
filed its complaint on January 14, 1958, and all the facts bearing on the issue of the Association's independence took place
from June 1957 to January 1958.
Section 1117 of the Labor Code provides in part:
"As used herein, 'labor organization' means any organization or any agency or employee representation committee or
any local unit thereof in which employees participate, and
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours
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of employment or conditions of work, which labor organization
is not found to be or to have been financed in whole or in part,
interfered with, dominated or controlled by tIle employer or
any employer association within one year of the commencement
of any proceeding brought under this chapter. The plaintiff
shall have the affirmative of the issue with respect to establishing the existence of a 'labor organization' as defined
herein. "
Section 1115 provides that a jurisdictional strike is unlawful and section 1118 defines such a strike as
" ... a concerted refusal to perform work for an employer
or any other concerted interference with an employer's operation or business, arising out of a controversy between two or
more labor organizations as to which of them has or should
have the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer on behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising
out of a controversy between two or more labor organizations
as to which of them has or should have the exclusive right
to have its members perform work for an employer." \
[3] If the Association was •• interfered with, dominated
or controlled"l by plaintiff, it is not a "labor organization"
within the meaning of section 1117 and there has been no
jurisdictional strike within the meaning of section 1118 .. The
determination of this issue is crucial to defendant's appeal
from the order granting a preliminary injunction against
defendant's strike. In deciding that issue' we must first
interpret the terms •• interfered with, dominated or controlled"
and then in the light of our interpretation determine whether
plaintiff sustained its burden of proving that the Association
is a labor organization.
[ 4] Federal decisions construing section 8 (a) (1) and
(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act 2 are persuasive
in interpreting section 1117, for the language and policy of
the two acts are similar. (See In re Porterfield, 28 Ca1.2d 91,
'Since defendant does not attack the trial court's finding that the
Association was not" financed in whole or in part" by p1aDrtiff, we have
no occasion to consider that part of section 1117.
'''It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restTain, or coeree employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in se~,tion 7 of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or eontribute financial support to
it .•.• "
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119 [168 P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675] ; Nuffer v. City of Santa
Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 298 [168 P.2d 741].) The federal
case!'; have singled out typical activities condemned by the
federal act. }'indings that an employer dominated an inside
union are usually based 011 obvious employer intrusion such as
statements by the employer to employees 011 company time and
property that he will not recogllize an outside union but will
deal 'with ail inside association, discharging employees who
solicit members for the outside union, openly leading the drive
for an inside association by supplying literature and lists of
the employees' names and addresses, permitting organizational
meetings on company property, and directly soliciting members for the inside association. (E.g., National Labor Relations
Board v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U.S. 318 [60 8.Ct. 918,
84 L.Ed. 1226]; see note, Employer-Dominated UniollsIllusory Self-O"ganization, 40 Columb.L.Rev. 278, 283-290.)
[5] Activities that constitute interference include manifestations by the employer that he favors one union over the
other (bderna.tiorialAssn. of M. T. D. M. L. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 311 U.S. 72, 78 [61 8. Ct. 83, 85 L.Ed\ 50]
[Slight suggestions as to the employer's choice between unions
may have telling effect among men who know the consequences
of incurring that employer's strong displeasure.]; National
Labor Relati01ls Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 600
[61 S.Ct. 358, 85 L.Ed. 368] [Intimations of an employer's
preference, though subtle, may bc as potent as outright threats
of discharge.] ) ; interrogation of employees as to their union
sympathies, especially when coupled with threats of discharge
for supporting the outside uJlion or promises of economic
benefits for remaining loyal to the company (Top Mode Manufacturing Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1290-1292, affirmed, National
Labor Relations Board v. Epstein, 203 F.2d 482 [cert. den.,
347 U.S. 912 [74 S.Ct. 474, 98 hEd. 1068]] ; Joy S1"lk Mills v.
National Labor Relations Bom'd, 185 F.2d 732, 740 [87 App.
D.C. 360] [cert. den., 341 U.S. 914 [71 S.Ct. 734, 95 L.Ed.
1350]]; solicitation by management of union withdrawal
letters (Texarkana Bus. Co. v. NatioJ/al Labor Relations Board,
119 F.2d 480, 483; National Labor RclaN011s Board v. United
Biscuit Co., 208 F.2d 52, 55 [cert. dell., 347 U.S. 934 [74 S.Ct.
629, 98 L.Ed. 1085]]); unequal a(hantag-es conferred upon
the inside union that are denied to the outside union, such as
use of company time and property (National Labor Relations
Board v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465,471; National Labor Relations
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Board v. Summers Fertilizer Co., 251 F.2d 514, 518); and
hasty recognition of the inside union, as contrasted with
marked reluctance to recognize. the outside union (National
Labor Relata'ons Board v. Clark, 176 F.2d 341,342). Moreover,
when an. inside union is formed behind picket lines close
scrutiny of its genesis is required. (National Labor Relations
Board v. Brown Paper Mill Co., 108 F.2d 867, 871 [cert. den.,
310 U.S. 651 [60 8.Ct. 1104, 84 L.Ed. 1416]] ; National Labor
Relations Board v. Summers Fertilizer Co., supra, at 518.1 )
The Fourth Circuit, finding employer domination even though
the employees signed an affidavit stating that their choice was
not coerced, pointed out that" [s]eldom does the domination
and interference with employee representation which the Act
prohibits take the form of threats or coercion. More often it
is to be found in the guise of friendly cooperation; . . ."
(American Enka Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
119 F.2d 60, 62.) Virtually all of these condemned activities
occurred in the present case. The trial court's finding that
the Association was not interfered with, dominated or controlled by plaintiff can only be attributed to its failure to appreciate the legal significance of plaintiff's conduct. (See
Estate of Madison, 26 Ca1.2d 453, 456 [159 P.2d 630] ; Sapp v.
Barenfeld, 34 Ca1.2d 515, 518 [212 P.2d 233] ; Pacific Pipeline
Canst. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 49 Ca1.2d 729, 735736 [321 P.2d 729] ; McNeil v. Board of Retirement, 51 Ca1.2d
278,284-285 [332 P.2d 281].)
[6] The undisputed evidence establishes plaintiff's background of hostility to any A.F.L.-C.I.O. union. Jeffrey Winfrey, who once served as plaintiff's route supervisor, testified
that he personally aided in installing a tape recorder in the
drivers' locker room to discover the men's response to a uni01~
organizational drive in 1952, and that Otto Petri, plaintiff's
president, instructed him not to hire any union men. Plaintiff
has operated as a nonunion shop since approximately 1950.
It concedes that Otto Petri is opposed to bargaining with any
A.F.L.-C.I.O. union and that his opposition is well known to
the employees. Of these, ten were route drivers aud twenty"The court's language is appropriate to this case: "It cannot be denied
that employees have a right to ehoose either an independent unaffiliated
union eomposed solely of fellow employees or a union affiliated with a
national or international organization, but where sueh ehoiee oceurs after
the initiation of organizational drives by other unions and after the
demand for reeognition by one of these unions, any form of benefit eontributed by the employer to a partie.ular union must be elosely examined."
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one worked inside the plant at cleaning, pressing, and dyeing
machines. During June and July of 1957 defendant attempted
to organize plaintiff's drivers, but not the inside employees.
Nine of the drivers signed authorization cards with defendant.
Plaintiff knew of defendant's activities, and during the first
week in July, Otto Petri questioned Archie Fraser, one of the
drivers, as --to his union sympathies. Fraser, a witness for
plaintiff, testified that Petri indicated that ". . . he did not
want to have anything to do with any union and as far as in
his present mind, he was not going to sign a contract with any
union or international union and that if I had taken the union
as my choice why then I would have to go or just, either take
the union or stay with him, have either choice." Owing to its
coercive effect, such interrogation, coupled with a direct threat
of discharge as a result of union membership. plainly constitutes interference. Moreover, when Fraser decided to renounce the union, Petri gave him a prepared letter of withdrawal to sign.
Around August 1, 1957, the management continued i~ coercive interviews by questioning Larson and Wolford, two
other drivers, about their union status. When they refused to
withdraw from the union, plaintiff gave them a week's termination notice, but on August 3, 1957, placed a notice on its
bulletin board offering them reinstatement. There is uncontradicted testimony that this offer did not indicate any change in
plaintiff's attitude. Larson testified that he refused to return
because "Mr. Petri had made it clear to me that he wasn't
going to accept the union so if I went back to work it would
be under the same conditions and with no union. • . ." He
stated that on the occasion of a subsequent visit to the plant,
Philbert, plaintiff's manager, saw him talking to some of the
drivers and told him that" ... he would just as soon the way
I felt that I wouldn't remain around the plant or any of his
drivers." Since there is no suggestion that Larson was interrupting the drivers' work, this statement can only mean that
plaintiff did not want its men exposed to union supporters.
and, therefore. that its opposition to defendant's organizational efforts had not ceased. Wolford accepted reinstatement,
but went on strike with the other drivers and later sought temporary employment elsewhere.
On August 6, 1957, defendant notified plaintiff by mail that
it had authorization cards from nine of the ten drivers and
requested a meeting with the management. At a meeting on

)
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August 7th, plaintiff's attorney stated that Petri would not
recognize any union. Following this meeting with the union
representatives, Petri called a meeting of the drivers and expressed the hope that they would work as usual the following
day despite an expected picket line. Fraser testified that some
of the drivers had refused to sign plaintiff's withdrawal letter
and that he understood the purpose of the meeting was to give
them "a last chance" to withdraw. Wolford testified that
plaintiff's attorney stated to the drivers that plaintiff "just
wasn't going to recognize a union as a bargaining agent."
Thus, before the strike began, plaintiff interfered with the
drivers' freedom of choice by compelling at least three of them
to choose between joining the union and continuing to work
for plaintiff.
On the morning of August 8, 1957, eight of the ten drivers
met in the union offices and voted unanimously to strike. One
of them, Max Williams, had previously signed a withdrawal
letter. When the strike began, nine of the drivers did not
report to work. Later in the day, plaintiff delivered a truck \
to Fraser at his home and he drove his route that day and
continuously thereafter. After about a week, two of the
strikers, Williams and Cohee, returned to work. Six drivers
who remained with the union were replaced by nonunion
employees.
Charles Bard, who had previously worked for plaintiff, was
hired on August 8th as the drivers' route supervisor. Shortly
after the strike began, he talked several times with Petri as
well as with plaintiff's attorney and John Philbert, plaintiff's
plant manager, about forming an inside union. They told him
that such a union would have to be formed by the employees
"in order for it to be legal." Petri said that the Bowen strike 4
had been broken by an inside union. Philbert asked him which
men would be loyal to plaintiff if an inside union were formed,
and Bard suggested Don Burns, the driver who had not signed
'The Bowen Cleaners are located in Santa Ana and operate a business
similar to plaintifi's. In March or April, 1957, a number of the Bowen
route drivers went on strike to secure recognition of another union as
their bargaining agent. Some time after the strike and peaceful picketing began, an association composed of the replacement drivers was
fonned, largely through the assistance of one R. N. Meader. Shortly
thereafter, the company attorney (who also represents plaintifi in this
ease) wrote to the union advising that a second union had been formed
and recognized by the company, that a jurisdictional dispute existed, and
instructed the union to cease picketing. When the union complied with
that demand, no litigation resulted.

)
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a union authorization card. They warned him that he could
net initiate the formation of such a union because he was on
the supervisory staff.
Burns testified that he had a conversation with Petri some
time in September and that Petri told him that" ... there was
a man that had something to do with the Bowen strike, that he
was negotiating with or had something to do with him, something in that manner and that he was gonna get one of the
drivers and one of the girls in the offiee ... to meet with him
to see if we could form a company unit." Burns further
testified that Petri requested him to keep the conversation
secret, that "he didn't want anyone knowing about it." Although Petri testified that he did not know Meader, the outside
organizer who had formed the employee's association at the
Bowen plant, he did not deny that he suggested the idea of a
company unit to Burns. Burns later refused to join the Association and voluntarily left plaintiff's employ during the hearing. He stated that he left because "I don't think that we
got any benefits in this company union. I don't think we are
gonna get any benefits from it, not in my opinion."
\
A maintenance man, Roland Matthews, testified that he
undertook to set up an inside union, primarily" ... to get the
plant settled down and get over the tension and so forth." He
learned of the Bowen strike around September 1st. Shortly
thereafter, he asked Philbert if plaintiff would negotiate with
an independent union. Philbert told him a few days later that
it would. Thereafter Matthews got in touch with Bowen, who
referred him to Meader. Matthews talked to Meader on the
telephone but they did not meet at that time.
Some time in December Matthews read a newspaper account
of the formation of an independent association at a laundry in
Los Angeles. He spoke to the president of that association
about the organization of such a group. He testified that he
had heard a rumor that defendant's picketing of plaintiff's
plant would increase after Christmas. He approached Petri
and told him ". . . that I was ready to go ahead with the
formation of the independent association if he was still in
accord with it, and if I start what assurance would I have
or could I assure the employees that he would take no part
in it, meaning that there would be no discrimination against
anyone that did take part in it, and he told me there wouldn't
be. If I needed any farther assurance to tell them to come
and ask him." Philbert later instructed Bard to inform any
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of th~ drivers who might inquire that the inside union "met
with the complete approval of the company." Petri's repeated
assurances that he would recognize the Association contrasted
with his refusal to recognize defendant made clear to the employees that plaintiff would bargain only with an unaffiliated
organization. Thus, plaintiff forced its workers to aecept the
organization that bore plaintiff's stamp of approval before
it was even formed or to forego collective bargaining altOl-rpther.
Matthews made an appointment with Meader and took a
list of the names and addresses of plaintiff's emplo:vees from
the company bulletin board to show Meader. At thcir first
meeting, shortly after Christmas, Meadpr told Matthews that
his fpe for helping to organize the Petri employees would be
$250 and inquired whether his fee would be paid by Matthews
or Petri. Matthews paid the fee himsplf and testified that no
OI1P had arranged to repay him. Meader selected two drivers
and two inside employees from the list. 'Within a few days
these four employees met with Matthews and Meader
Matthews' apartment building and arranged for an organizational meeting on January 8, 1958. Plaintiff refused Matthews'
request to hold the meeting on company property. He then
arranged to rent a hall a block away from the plant for the
meeting. A few days before the meeting, he spoke to Burns
about joining the Association. Burns stated that Matthews
". . . asked me if I was interested in getting the pickets off
the front .... " Matthews also circulated a petition among' the
employees stating: "We the undersigned agree to go along
with the majority in forming an Independent Laundry and
Dry Cleaning Association of driver salesmen and plant employees of Petris Cleaners." Of 18 employees who sigued the
petition, Archie Fraser was the only driver.
Normally the men stayed on their routes, either malting
deliveries or soliciting new cnstomers, lin til 5 p.m. Bard testified that Philbert instructed him to tell the drivers to come
in at 4 p.m. January 8th to attend the meeting and that" ...
he smiled and said, 'We are not supposcd to know anything
about this meeting.' " Bard and Philbert, pursuant to Petri's
orders, walked around the building in which the meeting was
being held to prevent troubl<>. That the Association's organizational meeting was guarded by plaintiff's manag<>r and its
supervisor indicates plaintiff's interest in having the inside
unit formed. ( Compare National Labor RelaNons Board v.

"t
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Vesmont American Furn. Corp., 182 F.2d 842, 843-844, holding the presence of employer's plant manager, treasurer and
superintendent in a hotel lounge adjacent to a lobby in which
the outside union was holding an organizational meeting improper surveillance by the employer.)
The meeting, which began at 5 p.m., was attended by all
eight drivers, four of whom had replaced the strikers, and
about seven of the inside employees. Meader explained the
method of organization. The group agreed upon a single organization with two separate bargaining units and elected
Archie Fraser chairman for the drivers and Matthews chairman for the inside workers. Meader gave Matthews a form
letter to use in demanding recognition. Matthews took the
letter to plaintiff's main office around 6 p.m. and one of plaintiff's employees typed a copy of the letter. Matthews then gave
it to Petri. At that time, none of the drivers except Archie
Fraser had stated in writing that he wished to join the Association.
Plaintiff's attorney notified defendant in a letter da'ed
January 9, 1958, that "as of this date a contract has been
entered into" between plaintiff and the Association; that "all
of the employees of Petri Cleaners, Inc., are members of said
Association"; and that defendant's picketing constituted a
violation of the Jurisdictional Strike Act.
Bard testified that on January 10th a letter arrived from
plaintiff's attorney addressed to Otto Petri. Petri then sent
for Archie Fraser and told him to sign a certain paper. Fraser
did so, and upon leaving Petri's office met one of the drivers
who asked him what he had signed. After a short discussion,
Fraser returned to Petri's office to reread the paper and told
the driver it was a recognition agreement. Fraser's statement
" ... started off a bombshell in the back because the drivers
said that nobody had given Archie authority to sign anything
like that. "
The agreement, dated January 9th, provides that plaintiff
recognizes the Association ., as the exclusive collective bargaining agency for all route salesmen," that plaintiff promises" to
sit down and consult with said Association and attempt to
arrive at a working agreement controlling wages, hours and
working conditions and other fringe benefits" and not to
recognize any other labor organization for a period of 120 days
and that the Association promises not to strike or affiliate with
any other labor organization for 120 days. Fraser testified on
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cross-examination that he had not requested any of the terms
of this contract except the recognition clause and that none of
its provisions were submitted to the other employees for their
approval.
On January 14, 1958, plaintiff called a meeting of all its
employees during working hours. At that time, plaintiff's
counsel asked them all to sign an affidavit stating that they
belonged to the Association; that the Association was "freely
and voluntarily formed by the undersigned employees, without coercion, financial aid, domination, or interference from
Petri Cleaners, Inc."; and that they did not wish to be represented by defendant. Bard testified that he stated to the
group that he would not sign the affidavit at that time if he
were a driver. All the drivers were present, but only two signed
the affidavit. Following the meeting, Philbert asked Bard why
he had influenced the drivers not to sign when their signatures
would be favorable to the company. Bard stated that he
thought the drivers should not relinquish their sole weaI\on,
and Philbert did not reply.
After obtaining the affidavit, plaintiff commenced this action
on January 14th, and requested a temporary restraining order
to remove the pickets. The court denied plaintiff's request
after defendant's attorney contended that the absence of any
contract covering wages, hours or working conditions created
doubt as to the bona fides of the Association. At about 5 :30
p.m. of the same day, Petri conferred with his attorney, and
then seut for Archie Fraser. Petri told Fraser that he wanted
to negotiate a contract with the drivers immediately, and asked
Fraser to submit a list of suggestions by J auuary 15th.
Fraser's request for an additional day was granted. On January 15th a meeting of all employees and a separate meeting
of the drivers were advertised on the company bulletin board
and held on company property-privileges extended to the
Association, but not to defendant. Bard again instructed the
drivers to return to the plant at 4 p.m. At the first meeting,
hf'ld after 5 p.m., Meader presented forms of a constitution,
bylaws, and a union contract. These documents were turned
over to a committee. At their own meeting, the drivers made
individual written suggestions, which Fraser compiled and
submitted to plaintiff.
On January 16th all the drivers but one met from 6 to 9 :30
p.m. on company property with Petri, Philbert, plaintiff's attorney and Bard, the route supervisor. Bard testified that one
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of the drivers asked why the negotiations were being pushed
so fast and stated that" ... the whole thing to him appeared
that it was just a matter of, a question of getting the pickets
off and getting very little back in return for it/' Later, plaintiff's attorney stated that" ... he would get the papers back
as quickly as possible because-in order that everybody could
sign the contract in order to present-to give a strouger case
in court. ,. Discussion centered around the drivers' suggestions
and the Bowen contract as a model. Plaintiff's attorne~
stated that he would draft a contract in line with the under·
standing of the group. The haste with which plaintiff signed a
contract with the drivers stands out in striking contrast with
the fact that there have been no negotiations, and no plans for
any between the inside plant employees and the company.
Bard also testified that the next morning Philbert ". . •
called me outside and said he'd like to thank me for the help
that I had given them on a couple of points and that he and Mr.
Petri.had been afraid prior to that that I was definitely on the
wrong side and influencing the drivers in the wrong way and
they were glad to see that I had taken a different attitude at
that meeting." This conversation was the third that Bard
reported between him and Philbert. The first, it will be recalled, was Philbert's instruction that Bard advise the drivers
that plaintiff completely approved of the Association. The
necond took place after the presentation of plaintiff's affidavit.
when Philbert asked Bard why he had influenced the drivers
not to sign the document. The clear purport of these conversations between plaintiff's plant manager and its route supervisor was to urge Bard to influence the drivers to support
plaintiff against defendant. Bard testified for defendant under
subpoena. He stated that Petri informed him prior to his
appearance as a witness that Petri was considering the abolition of his job as route supervisor, but that Bard could take
one of the routes if any were available.
Plaintiff received a draft of the contract on January 20th.
Although dated January 20th, it was not signed by the drivers
or the company until the morning of January 22nd, the date
of the hearing on the order to show cause. Petri testified that
he wanted the contract dated February 3rd, but ·the drivers
wanted it effective January 20th. Of the seven drivers who
signed the contract, three were among the original ten drivers
and four were replacements of the strikers. The contract contains a recognition clause, a union security clause, a no-strike

c.

"'

..

I

l.

Jan. 1960] PETBI

CLEANERS, INC. tI. AUTOMOTIVE
EMPLOYEES, ETC., LocAL No. 88

[53 C.2d .55; 2 Cal.RPtr.

no.

469

3.9 P.2d 76]

clause, a promise by the Association not to affiliate with any
othe~ labor organization, and provisions relating to wages,
hours, vacations and holidays.
The undisputed evidence, Ii viewed in light of our interpretation of section 1117, establishes as a matter of law that plaintiff
,. interfered with" the Association. Thus, to reiterate onl;\' the
more obvious of plaintiff's departures from its required role
of impartiality, its president and plant manager conducted
coercive interrogations, giving several drivers the •• choice"
of renouncing union membership or being discharged; plaintiff provided its drivers with a prepared letter of withdrawal
from defendant's organization and initially discharged two
drivers who refused to withdraw; plaintiff repeatedly announced that it would not bargain with defendant, while at the
same time encouraging the formation of the Association
through its assurances that the inside group enjoyed plaintiff's
complete approval, and plaintiff permitted the Association
to use its property and bulletin board at all meetings following the organizational meeting-a privilege it did not extend
to defendant.
Since plaintiff's conduct clearly constitutes interference,
the Association was not a labor organization within the meaning of section 1117. There was therefore no jurisdictional
strike under section 1118 and the order granting a preliminary
injunction against defendant's strike must be reversed.
The question remains whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a preliminary injunction to compel
plaintiff to recognize defendant as the exclusive bargaining
agent for plaintiff's drivers.
An employer's decision whether or not to bargain with a
labor organization has long been determined in this state by
the free interaction of economic forces. Early cases established
the legality of concerted activities for proper labor objectives
under common law principles (J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building
Tra.des Council, 154 Cal. 581, 599-600 [98 P. 1027,16 Ann.Cas.
1165, 21 L.R.A. N.S. 550] ; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156
Cal. 70, 75-76 [103 P. 324]). Sections 920-923 of the Labor
'Plaintiff's reliance upon its affidal'lts to raise a conflict is misplaced
because its affidavits are drawn in concluslonary terms. Affidavits that
merely stat.e conclusions of law are not el'ldence (Moon v. Moon, 62 Cal.
App.2d 185, 187 [144 P.2d 590); People v. Thomp8on, 5 Cal.App.2d 0:;5,
064 [43 P.2d 600» and do not create a conflict as to the facts (Coen Y.
Watson, 105 Cal.App. 297,300 [287 P. 525J).
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Codes imposed certain restrictions on the employer only "to
balll.nce the industrial equation, so far as it is possible to do so,
by placing employer and employee on an equal basis."
(Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Ca1.2d 379, 385
[106 P.2d 403].) [7] Thus, section 921 provides that
promises embodied in yellow-dog contracts shall not be enforced. Section .922 provides that any person who coerces
another to enter into such a contract as a condition of employment is guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 923 announces
it the public policy of this state "to uphold the freedom of
employees to organize and enter into collective bargaining
contracts for their own protection." (Levy v. Superior Court,
15 Ca1.2d 692, 704 [104 P.2d 770, 129 A.L.R. 956].) These
·Section 920: "As used in this chapter, unless the eon text otherWise
indicates, 'promise' includes promise, undertaking, eontract, or agreu·
ment, whether written or oral, express or implied."
Section 921: "Every promise made after August 21, 1933, between
any employee or prospective employee and his employer, prospective em·
ployer or any other person is eontrary to public policy if either party
thereto promises any of the following:
"(a) To join or to remain a member of a labor organization or to join
or remain a member of an employer organization,
"(b) Not to join or not to remain a member of a labor organization
or of an employer organization.
•
"(e) To withdraw from an employment relation in the event that be
joins or remains a member of a labor organization or of an employur
organization.
"Such promise shall not afford any basis for the granting of legal or
equitable relief by any court against a party to such promise, or against
any other persons who advise, urge, or induce, without fraud or violence
or threat thereof, either party thereto to act in disregard of suell
promise."
Section 922: "Any person or agent or oftic.er thereof who coerces or
eompels any person to enter into an agreement, written or verbal, not to
join or become a member of any labor organization, as a condition of
securing employment or eontinuing in the employment of any such person
is guilty of a misdemeanor."
.
Section 923: "In the interpretation and application of this chapter,
the public policy of this State is declared as follows:
"Negotiation of terms and eonditions of labor should result fronl
voluntary agreement between employer and employees. Governmental
authority has permitted and encouraged employers to organize in the
corporate and other forms of capital control. In dealing with such employers, the individual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual
liberty of contract and to protect his free<lom of labor, and thereby to
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment. Therefore it id
necessary that the individual workman have full freedom of association,
self·organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing,
t.o negotiate the terms and eonditions of his employment, and that he shall
be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor,
or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in selforganization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of eollective
bar&"ainin&" or other mutual aid or protection."

)

Jan. 1960] PETRI CLEANERS,

INC. 1). AUTOMOTIVE
EMPLOYEES, ETC., LOCAL No. 88

471

[53 C.2d "55; 2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76J

sections do not preclude promises to join independent labor
organ~zations (Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, supra,
at 386-387), closed or union shop contracts, or concerted
activities to obtain such contracts. (McKay v. Reta,a, Auto.
S. L. Union No. 1067, 16 Cal.2d 311, 327 [106 P.2d 373];
Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, supra, at 387; C. S.
Smith Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Ca1.2d 389, 396 [106 P.2d
414] ; Park & T. I. Corp. v. Inter11ational etc. of Teamsters,
27 Ca1.2d 599, 609-612 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426].)
Neither do they place on the employer an affirmative duty to
bargain, as the opening sentence of section 923 makes clear:
"Negotiation of terms and conditions of labor should result
from voluntary agreement between employer and employees."
An employer faced with a union's demand for recognition
still has "the choice of yielding to the union's demands or
continuing to endure the interference with its business relations which the (union's) activi~ies caused." (C. S. Smith
Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, supra, at 397.)
[8] The Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 11151120, 1122)7 was designed, not to diminish free competition
~Seetion 1115: ' 'A jurisdictional strike as berein defined is bereby
dee1ared to be against the public policy of the State of California and is
bereby deelared to be unlawful."
.
Seetion 1116: "Any person injured or tbreattned with injury by vio·
lation of any of the provisions hereof shall be entitled to injunctive relief
therefrom in a proper case, and to recover any damages resulting there·
from in any court of competent jurisdiction."
Seetion 1117: "As used herein, 'labor organization' means any organi.
zation or any agency or employee representation committee or any local
unit thereof in which employees participate, and exists for the purpose,
in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, hours of employment or conditions of work, which labor
organization is not found to be or to have been financed in wbole or in
part, interfered with, dominated or controlled by the employer or any
employer association within one year of the commencement of any pro·
eeeding brought under this chapter. The plaintiff man bave the affirma·
tive of the issue with respect to establishing the existence of a 'labor
organization' as defined herein.
"As used herein, 'person' means any person, association, organization,
partnership, corporation, unincorporated association, or labor organiza·
tion. "
Section 1118: "As used in this chapter, 'jurisdictional strike' means
a concerted refusal to perform work for an employer or any other con·
certed interference with an employer's operation or business, arising out
of a controversy between two or more labor organizations as to which
of them has or should have the,exclusive right to bargain collectively with
an employer on behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising out of
a controversy between two or more labor organizations as to which of
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between labor and industry, but to release an innocent employer caught between the rival claims of two or more labor
organizations. It does not apply unless there are at least two
"labor organizations" within the meaning of section 1117, and
the prohibited actiyity arises out of a dispute between them
as to which has the exclusive right to bargain with an employer
or to have its members work for him. (Lab. Code, § 1118;
Seven-Up etc: -Co. v.· Groc"ery etc. Union, 40 Cal.2d 368, 381
[254 P.2d 544, 33 A.L.R. 327].) The employer may not only
enjoin a jurisdictional strike (Lab. Code, § 1116) but refuse
to bargain with either organization.
[9] It is for the Legislature to determine whether voluntary bargaining should now be displaced by a rule compelling
the eiuployer to bargain with the representatives of a majority
of his employees. Recognizing that trial courts are hardly
labor relations boards, defendant requests affirmative relief,
avowedly because the record is so clear as to raise only issues
of law. But, as the United States Supreme Court observed
of a similar argument, •• we write not only for this case and
this day alone, but for this type of case." (Carroll v. Lanza,
349 U.S. 408, 413 [75 S.Ct. 804, 99 L.Ed. 1183].) A host of
problems attend compulsory bargaining ~at only the Legislature can resolve. What constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit' (See §§ 8 (a) (3) (i); 9 (b) ; 29 U.S.C. §§ 158,
159.) How is the majority's choice to be determined f (See
§ 9 (c) (1); 29 U.S.C., § 159.) Which employees constitute
the relevant majority, those presently employed or those
employed at the time the employer's refusal to bargain precipitated the strike' Congress recently changed the federal
definition of the relevant majority. The Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 provided that "Employees on strike who
are not entitled to reinstatement shall not be eligible to vote."
them has or mould have the exclusive right to have its members perform
work for an employer."
Section 1119: "Nothing in this chapter mall be construed to interfere with collective bargaining subject to the prohibitions herein Bet
forth, nor to prohibit any individual voluntarily becoming or remaining
a member of a labor organization, or from personally requesting any
other individual to join a labor organization."

.

.....

Section 1122: •• Any person who organizes an employee group which is
financed in whole or in part, interfered with or dominated, or eontrollpd
by the employer or any employer association, as well as such emplOYflr
or employer association, shall be liable to suit by any person who is
Dljured thereby. Said injured party shall recover the damages Bustarued
by him and the costs of Buit."
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(§ 9 (c) (3); 29 U.S.C., § 159.) Dissatisfaction with this rule

(see, e.g., Right to Vote During an Economic Strike, 16 U. of
ChLL.Rey. 537) led to the 1959 provision that "Employees
engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the
Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and provisions of this Act in any election conducted within twelve
months after the commencement of the strike." (Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.
§ 702.) The enforcement of the duty to bargain under the
federal act has been practicable only because the necessary
administrative machinery and statutory guides have been provided. This court cannot usurp legislative power by enacting
rules of law patterned on the Labor Management Relations
Act, and it cannot create the administrative machinery necessary to make such rules workable.
Defendant contends, however, that three decisions of this
court lead to compulsory bargaining. (Garmon v. San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Ca1.2d 595 [320 P.2d 473] ; Chavez
v. Sargent, 52 Ca1.2d 162 [339 P.2d 801] ; Rctail Clerks' UnUm
v. Superior Court, 52 Ca1.2d 222 [339 P.2d 839].) By reinterpreting section 923 of the Labor Code and Invoking the
Jurisdictional Strike Act, the court in the Gth-mon case held
that a closed or union shop contract is au unlawful labor
objective under state law when none of the employees wish
to join or be represented by the union. The court's conclusion
that by signing a closed or union shop agreement the employer would interfere with his employees' rights "in the
designation of ... representatives or in self-organization or in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" (Lab. Code, § 923) in
violation of section 923 was directly contrary to the settled rule
that section 923 does not restrict the right of labor to ellgage
in concerted activity to attain a closed or union shop. (Shafer
v. Re.gistercd Pharmacists Union, supra, at 387.) Furthermore,
the Garmon case was decided on the erroneous assumption that
the conduct found tortions under state law was also illegal
under federal law, and it was reversed on the question of
federal pre-emption in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 [79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ecl.2d 775J.
In Chavez v. Sargent, supra, this court departed from rules
based on the free interaction of economic forces and determined that collective bargaining must be pursued or not ac-
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cording to the wishes of the majority of the employees directly
involved. Under the reasoning of that case, the employer
cannot interfere with the majority's freedom of self-organization by agreeing to bargain with any agent other than the
majority's chosen representative. It follows that he may not
stultify the majority's choice by refusing to bargain at all.
Otherwise, the requirement of majority rule, instead of aiding
the majority's efforts for <'.Ollective bargaining, would benefit
only the employer who could defeat the efficacy of the majority's choice of a representative. Unless the employer recognizes the majority's chosen representative, he necessarily
interferes with the majority's freedom of choice by preventing
its practical culmination.
In undertaking to restate the labor law of California, however, the Chavez case went beyond the issue before the court.
To support the holding that the local ordinance there involved
was invalid, it was necessary only to decide that concerted
activity to secure closed or union shop contracts and contracts
resulting therefrom were protected as part of the workman '8
"full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing." (Lab. Code,
§ 923.) By going further and setting up a new system of
labor law based on majority rule insteac1 of the free interaction
of economic forces, the case would turn our trial courts into
labor relations boards without legislative guidance or necessary
administrative machinery.
These difficulties may not have been foreseen when the dicta
in Chavez were applied in Retail Ole1'ks' Union v. Superior
Court, supra, to enjoin concerted activity that was theretofore
clearly legal. Since none of the employees there involved had
designated the picketing unions as their bargaining representatives, no problem of determining the relevant majority was
presented. The problems that lay dormant in this negative
application of the Chavez case cannot be escaped, however,
when, as in this case, its positive corollaries are sought to be
enforced. In this type of case, the trial court is asked to sit as
a labor board and thus determine the appropriateness of
bargaining units, conduct elections, certify the majority representative, and direct collective bargaining.
[10] We conclude that employers are not required by
law to engage in collective bargainiug and that closed or
union shop agreements and concerted actiyities to achieve them
are lawful in this state whether or not a majority of the em-
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ployees directly involved wish such agreements. If a contrary
rule is to be established, the Legislature, not this court, must
enact it. The Garmon and Retail Clerks' Union cases are,
therefore, overruled. Insofar as it is inconsistent with the
views expressed herein, the Chavez case is disapproved.
The order granting plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief is
reversed and the order denying defendant's motion for injunctive relief is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., and White, J., concurred.

•
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SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-On May 19, 1959, in Chavez
v. Sargent, 52 Ca1.2d 162 [339 P.2d 801], we reviewed the
policy and effect of section 923 of the Labor Code and related
statutes (Lab. Code, §§ 920-923, 1115-1122, 1126), and a
majority of this court recognized the following propositions:
"[Pp. 186-187 [14] of 52 Cal.2d.] It is of primary importance that the individual workman have protection-that
he have' full frecdom' of 'self-association' and in the designation of representatives of 'his own choosing.' But it is also
essential that the group's lawfully selected negotiators have
power and freedom of contract to secure the workman's interests by contract with employers, and that for the ultimate
benefit of each individual workman the authorized representative shall be able to wield the collectivf' power of all ....
"[P. 197 [29] id.] If employes have voluntarily become
members of any' labor organization' (not financed or interfered
with by their employer, Lab. Code, § 1117) and have thereby
or therein selected and authorized a bargaining agent, such
agent and the employer are free to bargain for the respective
legitimate objectives of both workmen and employer. The
ensuing collective agreement may, of course, include provisions
for union security, such as a union shop, maintenance of
membership, and exclusive bargaining rights with the employer. " .
" [Po 198 [32] id.] The right of the workman to participate
in the selection of his bargaining agent and in the government
of his union is the workman's right of self-determination.
Organization and collective bargaining are but tools to that
end ....
"[P. 203 [37] id.] It is a primary rule that 'courts are
bound to give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary
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import of the language employed in framing them.' (In t'e
Alpi1ic (1928), 203 Cal. 731, 737 [3] [265 P. 947, 58 A.L.R.

1500].J ...
" I Pp. 205-206 145, 46] id.l For an employer to notify
his employes that he has agreed with a union which is, and
which he knOWl> to be, unauthorized and unwanted by his employes, that they must join such union and be represented
by it or be dismissed from employment would appear to constitute an unlawful interference hy the employer and subject
him to the liability imposed by section 1122.
•• Industrial self-government is a goal to be desired. Insofar as problems arise over issues which are not specifically
covered by legislation they should be •solved by looking to the
policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will
effectuate that policy.' (See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills (1957), ... 353 U.S. 448, 457 [77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d
972].) ...
"[P. 212, footnote 14, id.] It should be noted that where an
organization which has been fairly selected by the majority
vote of all the employes of an employer (or of an affected craft
or group) seeks union security [or other lawful objective],the organization acting for all such employes may use lawful
forms of pressure (e.~., the strike, picketing, etc.) to induce
the employer to grant'that condition of labor. From what has
hereinabove been said in the discussion of sections 921 and
923 it is ob"ious that the freedom declared is the freedom from
employer interference in such matters as association, organization and selection of representatives, to the end that through
the democratically chosen representatives collective bargaining
agreements may be negotiated. The workmen, having had the
opportunity to freely participate in such procedures, are, of
course, bound by the majority vote, and the contract negotiated
will be the contract of all.... "
Today a differently constituted majority disapprove those
views and overrule Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Oouncil
(1958), 49 Cal.2d 595 [320 P.2d 473], and Retail Olerks'
U11ion v. Superior Oourt (1959), 52 Cal.2d 222 [339 P.2d
839]. Of course, as a matter of law, the majority possess the
power to overrule the above cited cases. They have so used
that power; whether wisely or otherwise remains to be seen.
It is my view that the majority action inevitably will set
back, for we know not how long nor how repercussively, the
cause of law-guided and peacefully negotiated settlements of
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labor disputes in California industry.l I think that by the
majority's action workmcn will suffer; employers will suffer;
the public will suffer; unions and union leaders who prefer
self-government under law will suffer; only those union organizers who eschew responsibility under law and who have
110 regard for the general welfare and freedom of the individual workman will prosper .•
Each of those facts appears implicit in the express "disapproval" of Ohavez v. Sargent and the overruling of Garmon
and Retail Clerks' Union. Prominent among the Chavez
and Garmon rulings which are disapproved and overruled
is the holding that it is unlawful for an employer to make a
contract with a labor "organizer" who represents none of
the affected employes whereby the employer agrees that h!'
will compel his workmen, on pain of discharge, to join the
organizer's union and to "consent" that the employer shall
deduct "dues" from the employes' pay checks for remittance
to their "organizer"-their unchosen and unwanted "representative." The majority's ruling means also that if the
employer does not voluntarily agree to sign such contract,
when demanded by the "organizer," the latter may place
pickets around'the employer's plant and damage or destroy
the business. Thus "blackmail picketing" is restored in
California.
Not only do the new majority disapprove or overrule the
cited cases; they also hold that Labor Code, section 923, either
does not mean what its words say or that it is unenforcible
for want of further statutory implementation. The eRsential
words of section 923 as enacted by the Legislature are: " [T] he
public policy of this State is declared as follows: Negotiation
of terms and conditions of labor should result from voluntary agreement between employer and employees. . . • In
1The overruling today of Garmon, resulting in re-creation of a "noman's land" in California, seems peculiarly lamentable because under
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 it is expressly provided that the state courts shall be competent to exercise jurisdiction in the "no-man 's land" which formerly existed when the Nationnl
Labor Relations Board refused to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute.
Bueh as that in Garmon, whieh affected interstate commerce. (Garmon v.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Oouncil (1958), supra, 49 Cal.2d 595, 598.)
Section 14(c) (2) of the Na.tional Labor Relations Act now provides
that "Nothing in this Aet [National Labor Relations Act as a.mendedl
shall be deemed to prevent or bar ... the courts of any State •.. from
assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the
Board declines ••• to assert jurisdiction. ' ,
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dealing with. . . employers, the individual unorganized
worker is helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and
to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment. Therefore it
is necessary that the individual workman have full freedom
of association, sel~organization, and desig1UJtio-n of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from
the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor,
or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." (Italics added.) Those words and the policy they
enunciate seem clear enough to me to be understandable and
enforcible.
But the new majority say, "It is [still] for the Legislature
to determine whether voluntary bargaining should now be
displaced by a rule compelling the employer to bargain with
the representative of a majority of his employees." (P. 472
[9], ante.) "Voluntary bargaining," the new majority further
hold, may be bargaining not even participated in by the
workmen but solely between an employer coerced by picketing
or threats of picketing and an "organizer" who represents
none of the affected employes but who wants to add them
to his <\lIes-paying but non-franchised constituency-his stock
in trade.
The new majority hold that in California the employes
need not be permitted to participate in selecting "their
OVI'D" bargaining representatives; that such employes, if the
"organizer" and employer so agree, must accept the unwanted organizer (or his union, if in fact he represents any
existing organization) as their "representative" or be discharged from employment. This action by the employer, the
majority hold, notwithstanding the provisions of Labor Code,
sections 923 and 11172 and related sections, does not constitute "interference" by the employer. Such majority hold
that section 923 cannot be enforced because" A host of prob'Section 1117 provides, "As used herein [Jurisdictional Strike Law},
'labor organization' means any organization or any agency or employee
represent.ation committee or any local unit thereof in which employees
participate, and exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of
employment or conditions of work, which labor organization is not found
to be or to have been 1Inaneed in whole or in pari, interfered with, domi-.
nated or controlled by the employer or any employer association within 1
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lems attend compulsory bargaining [if attempted by employes but not if conducted by a self-appointed "organizer"]
that only the Legislature can resolve. [The host of insurmountable problems are:] What constitutes an appropriate
bargaining unit' . . • How is the majority's choice to be
determined f • • • Which employees constitute the relevant
majority . . . f" (P. 472, ante.) Therefore, it is held, the
"individual workman," whose "full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of his
own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his
employment" is so unequivocally expressed in section 923,
is in truth not even entitled to vote in the selection of his
bargaining representative. In my opinion, as explained in
more detail infra, p. 494 et seq., the courts of California
are capable of dealing with these and related problems and
refusal to undertake solution of such problems is a gratuitous and unwarranted assertion of judicial impotence.
It is to be observed that the demanding organizer's union
(assuming that he actually represents an already existing
organization) which, by the majority holding, may properly
force the employer both to bargain with it and to force his
unwilling employes to join, need not be a genuine, reputable
labor organization in any sense of the word. It need not
give the employes who are compelled to accept it as their
representative any voice in the terms of employment which
it negotiates for them or any choice as to what officer or
agent of the union shall speak for them in the negotiations.
All the employe need receive from the union is the "right"
to carry a union card in return for the "privilege" and
"duty" of paying dues, together with such rights as the
courts somehow have managed in the past to recognize and
protect without statutory guidance (e.g., the right not to be
arbitrarily excluded from union membership where the union
has attained a monopoly of the supply of labor by means
of closed shop agreements (James v. Marinship Corp. (1944),
25 Cal.2d 721, 730-731 [4] [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900])
and the right not to be disciplined or expelled from the union
without notice, hearing, opportunity to confront and crossexamine his accusers and to examine and refute the evidence
one year of the commencement of any proceeding brought under this
cllapter. The plainti1f shall have the affirmative of the issue with respect
to establishing the existence of a 'labor organization' 8S defined
herein.••• "
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against him (Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn. (1951), 37
Cal.2d 134, 143-144 [12, 14, 15] [321 P.2d 6, 21 A.L.R.2d
1387]).
The present majority's concept of what constitutes "freedom" of self-organization and "voluntary" bargaining, it
seems to me, is definitely opposed not only to the statutes
of California but also to widely expressed recent thinking in
the field of labor-management-individual-workman relations,
as evidenced, for example, by the federal IJabor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. That act provides,
among other things, a "Bill of Rights[S] of Members of Labor
Organizations, " with the following requirements:
Section 101 (a) (1) : "Every member of a labor organization
shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or refendendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon
the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and
regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws."
Section 101 (a) (2) : "Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with
other members; and to express any views . . ., and to express
at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any
business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules . • ."
Members are given a voice, either by direct vote or vote
of their representatives, as to increase of dues or levy of
assessments, "[e]xcept in the case of a federation of national
or international labor organizations" (§ 101 (a) (3»; their
right to sue in the courts or seek relief before administrative
agencies is protected (§ 101(a) (4»; and it is provided that
they cannot be disciplined except for nonpayment of dues
"In ClwweSl v. Sargent (1959), .vpra, 52 Cal.2d 162, 194 [27] it ill Doted
that" As Dearly as labor may be said to have a governmentally declared
Bill of Rights in California, it is that enunciated in lection 923. It is
that section which undertakes to insure to each individual workman free·
dom to BSlociate, to organize, to select representatives to negotiate for
his group, and through those representatives and the strength of his
organization, to bargain collectively. In particular it is that section which
provides for the workman whatever democraey there may be in his union."
The most fundamental of the same elements of protection to workmen
as are defined in the 1959 federal act were in California's Bill of Rights
(enumerated in Lab. Code, t 923, and related Bections) as recognized and
upheld (until disapproved today) in Cha1!8SI v. Stwge'll.t. (Bee id.,
pp. 191·192 [20-16].)
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without being served with specific written charges, given
reasonable time to prepare a defense, and afforded a full and
fair hearing (§ ]Ol(a) (5)).
Specifically I note that no statutory scheme for protecting
the foregoing rights is spelled out; the union member is
simply given the right to "bring a civil action in a district
court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate" (§ 102). As hereinabove indicated, under California law, until today, the workman in
intrastate commerce had in state courts an equivalent remedy
for substantially similar rights.
1 would also mention at this point that, adding to the
difficulty of the California employe who is not subject to
the federal labor acts is the further holding of the majority
(hereinafter more fully discussed) that "when an inside
union is formed behind picket lines close scrutiny of its
genesis is required." (P. 461, ante.) Thus the invading
union, however corrupt it may be, is, under the majority
opinion, apparently subject to no scrutiny, but when it throws
a picket line around a shop which the employes have chosen
to keep unorganized, any labor organization formed by those
employes in self-defense is suspect and likely, under the majority view, to be held to be a company-interfered-with group
as a matter of law. As hereinafter explicitly shown, the majority today exemplify that principle and, by the extreme
expedient of resolving conflicts in the evidence contrary to
the resolution thereof by the trial judge, reach a directly
contrary judgment.
One of the most important elements of the state's labor
policy which is expressed in Labor Code, section 923-and
which is today held unenforcible-is the provision for complete freedom of workmen in self-organization and selection
of representatives of their own choosing. That element is
important not only to give workmen the right of self-government in their own organization but also to guard against
the rash acts which experience has taught us are likely to
tome from the concentration of unbridled power in one man
or a small dominated group. The most basic principle of the
California plan is destroyed when the right of direct control
is taken from the workmen and given to a self-appointed or~alljzer. The latter thus is enthroned not as a representative
of the workmen but as their boss.
As recognized in Chavez v. Sargent (1959), supra, p. 185
53 C.2d-16
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of 52 Cal.2d, it is altogether clear that there are individual
labor leaders and some followers who are averse to regulation by law or to the settlement of labor disputes through
the judicial process. Illustrative of the preference by some
labor leaders for settlement of disputes by means other than
the relatively peaceful and restrained judicial process, and
of the tactics to which they will resort when, for whatever
reason, they eSChew the law, are the facts in People v. Osslo
(1958), 50 Ca1.2d 75 [323 P.2d 397].4

.

)

)

·The Osslo decision affirms judgments of conviction of conspiracy to·
commit assault and of aggravated assault, arising out of a dispute in
San Diego between the Clerks' union, which handled retail sales of frozen
dinners, and the Butchers' union, which sought jurisdiction of such sales.
The defendant.s were Osslo <an official of the Butchers' local, of the
affiliated but.chers' unions of California, anel of the International
Butchers' union), two business agents of the Butchers' local, and five
men (Hazel, a Teamster, and Dimitratos, Cacio, Tucker, and Dempster,
members of the Sailors Union of the Pacific) imported by 08s10 from
San Francisco through the Sailors Union and employed to act in con·
nection with the dispute. (P. 89 of 50 Ca1.2d.) "Representatives of the
Butchers and the Clerks met [to discuss their conflicting claims] .•• The
secretary·treasurer of the Clerks' local 'made demand upon Mr. Osslo
••• to have the merchandise in dispute ••• placed back under the juris·
diction of the Clerks, or our organization would take t:1Jery legal meaf18
necessary to enforce the jurisdiction.' (Italics added.) Osslo 'pounded
the table three times, stated he was boss of the West Coast and he would
fight for jurisdiction.••• [Four days before the assault] the Clerks
filed with the National Labor Relations Board a petition 'for the purpose
of having the Board determine who jurisdiction belonged to.' " Busi.
ness agents of the Butchers, with the imported sailors, "started calling
on the markets." (Pp. 83·84 of 50 Ca1.2d.)
During one of tbeir visits to a market, as described by an eye witness
and recounted in the opinion (p. 92 of 50 Oa1.2d), "These five defend·
ants [the sailors] surrounded Clerks Montgomery and Maurer and some
of the defendants stomped on Montgomery's and Maurer's feet.
'Dimitratos and Hazel attempt[ed] to get Montgomery, but he •••
[though pursued] got away and tbey stepped right back out ••. Maurer
couldn't get ••• past the customers because of a railing and a bunch of
pushcarts •.. and he was being pursued ... until two men got hold of
him and held him • . .' Cacio stmck Maurer in the stomach. Dempster
and Tucker pinned Maurer's arms to his sides. 'Dimitratos judo chopped
bim terribly, fift.een or twenty shots,' and 'Hazel was bombing in with
bis fists and lIith judo chops.' Maurer was beaten and kicked. '[W]hen
they let go and dropped him to the floor he was in kind of a hulk lying
on bis side. That is when Cacio used the boots on him . . . . Kicked him
in the back twice and then he flopped over on his bac.k and he was kicked,
I think, right in the side terribly hard.' "
nlustrating situations in which a union and its officers set in motion
a picket plan, encouraged or evidenced irresponsibility in controlling and
disregard of their duty to control their members' resort to violenee and
intimidation in violation of court order, and then Bought to evade legal
responsibility for the acts of the rank and file, are 8teiner v. LOfI,g Beach
I,oeal No. 188 (1942),19 Ca1.2d 676, 685-686 [6, 7] [123 P.2d 20] [union
officers were present and directed picketing which included disorder and
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The present majority of this court make it clear that they
consider that the courts are powerless to protect the rights
of the individual workmen and their freely chosen bargaining
representative (as contemplated by Labor Code, section 923,
and related statutes) in the absence of "necessary administrative machinery and statutory guitles" (p. 473, ante)
and that disputes with an employer who is not engaged in
interstate commerce, or labor disputes which affect such
commerce but as to which the National Labor Relations Board
declines jurisdiction, ~ must be resolved by "the free [and
destructive] interaction of economic forces" (p. 473, ante)
such as those which have been at work in the subject dispute,
without the aid of the judicial process. I cannot agree that
the courts are so impotent or incompetent that they cannot
or should not in a proper case give force to the statutorily
declared public policy of this state in this important field.
My views in this regard are stated in more detail infra,
p. 492 et seq .
It appears to me that nationally the trend of thinking
is generally toward firmer enforcement and further development of laws governing intra-labor group and labor-management excesses rather than toward relaxation and back-pedalling. In this regard I call attention to United Steelworkers
v. United States (1959), 361 U.S. 39 [80 S.Ct. 1, 4 L.Ed.2d
violence in violation of a preliminary injunction, and personally paTticipated in shadowing employes and customers of the picketed employer] ;
Oil Workers Intl. Union v. Superior COllrt (1951), 103 Cal.App.2d 512,
552 [18], 554-555, 565 [230 P.2d 71] [offieers of the loeal union did
not inform picketing members, who threw stones and made threats, of
the terms of a temporary restraining order which the officers felt was
"just another move on the part of the Company to break the strike and
weaken the morale of the members"; the president of the international,
in a speech to the members, asked them not to encourage violence "just
so long as your pieket lines remain inviolate "l.
'We must reeognize that the area in which eonduet eonneeted with a
labor dispute was formerly irremediable even though it was tortious
under state law and an unfair labor practice under federal law (sec
Chat'ez v. Sargent (1959), slipra, 52 Ca1.2d 162, 208-211) will prohably be much reduced under the 1959 amendment of section 14 of the
National Labor Relations Act to provide til at "(e) (1) The [National
Labor Relations] Board, in its discretion, may . . . decline to assert
jurisdiction oyer any labor dispute ... where, in the opinion of the Board,
the effect of such labor dispute on eommerce is not sufficiently substantial
to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction . . . (2) Nothing in this Act.
shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any State'
. . . from Rssuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over
which tlle Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection,
• to assert jurisdiction. "
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12, 169], in which the United States Supreme Court, per
curiam, upholds an injunction obtained by the United States
Attorney General under section 208 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 as amended (29 U.S.C.A. § 178).
That section provides that a district court, on petition of
the Attorney General at the President's direction, has jurisdiction to enjoin a strike or lock-out "and to make such
other orders as may be appropriate," if the court finds that
such strike or lock-out affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in interstate or foreign commerce or production of goods for commerce and will, if
permitted, imperil the national health and safety.
In affirming the order of the court of appeals, which
affirmed the district court's order against the contentions
of the petitioner union, the supreme court says (p. 4 of 80
S.Ct.): "The petitioner suggests that a selective reopening
of some of the steel mills would suffice to fulfill specific defense needs. . . . There is no room in the statute for this
requirement which the petitioner seeks to impose upon the
Government. . . •
". . . Petitioner contends that the statute is constitutionally invalid because it does not set up any standard of
lawful or unlawful conduct on the part of labor or management. But the statute does recognize certain rights in tl1e
public to have unimpeded for a time production in industries
vital to the national health or safety. It makes the United
States the guardian of these rights in litigation. [Citations.)
The availability of relief, in the common judicial form of an
injunction, depends on findings of fact, to be judicially
made.'"
The very fact of enactment by Congress and signing by
the President of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (1959 Pocket Part of (1956) 29 U.S.C.A.),
providing a "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organiza"It is also to be noted that the vigorous language of Justiee Brandeis,
dissenting in Duplex Printing PreB8 Co. v. Deering (1921),254 U.S. 443,
488 r41 S.Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349, 16 A.L.R. 196]-deelaring that the
Legislature, in eonnection with industrial disputes, "may substitute
proeesses of justiee for the more primitive method of trial by eombat"now appears in the eoneurring opinion of Justiees Frankfurter and Harlan
(p. 182 of 80 S.Ct.), and those eoneurring justiees pertinently add that
seetions 206 through 209 of the Labor Management Relations Aet of 1947
liS amended "were designed to provide maehinery for safeguarding th"
eomprehensive interest of the eommunity, and to promote the national
})oliey of eollective bargaining. They mUBt be cOfIBtruea to /live fun effect J
to tAe protectioM 'Acy see} to aflord." (Italies added.)
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tions," much like California's Bill of Rights for workmen
as recognized in Ohavez v. Sargent (1959), supra, 52 Cal.2d
162, 194 [27], is strong evidence that there is a rising need
for government under law in labor disputes, rather than
for abdication of the court (decreed by the majority today)
in favor of "the free interaction of economic forces" (p.469,
ante) such as those applied in this case-and on a larger scale
in the recently abated and thereafter settled steel strike.
Lest it be urged that the above related actions of Congress
and the President in 1959 have no popular support beyond
the halls of Congress and the White House, it seems proper
to quote from an address by Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson to the
Institute of Life Insurance in New York City on December
8, 1959, as reported in the U. S. News & World Report (Dec.
21, 1959; vol. XLVII, No. 25, p. 104): "The steel strike
dramatizes the fact HIIl.t we are now at the end of an era.
Everybody is agreed that this cannot happen again; that the
public interest is the paramount interest, and that irresponsible private power is an intolerable danger to our beleaguered
society...•
"Where private groups-like big business or big laborare performing public functions, they must be held to pUblic
responsibility. And one may forecast with some certainty
that the Supreme Court will increasingly hold them to this
responsibility. . . .
"In September it proved necessary, for the first time in
our history, for Government to establish controls over the
internal affairs of the labor unions-their constitutions, their
electic:ms, the administration of their offices-because of the
irresponsibility of a comparatively few labor leaders. This
was a failure, not just for the unions, but for democracy.
The system is weaker today than it would have been if labor
had done for itself what Government has now had to do
for it."
In the face of the facts recounted I deem it regrettable
that California today steps backward.
Turning to the narrower aspects of the subject case, it is
my further opinion that the evidence does not, as a matter
of law, establish employer interference with the employes'
association within the meaning of section 1117 of the Labor
Code. I recognize that, so far as the evidence now before us
discloses, defendant union, through an organizer authorized
to do so, between June 27 and August 6, 1957, without im-
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proper pressure obtained tJle freely chosen written authorization of nine of the ten drivers then employed by Petri that
the union should represent them in collective bargaining. 7
During this period between June 27 and August 6, 1957, the
employer threatened to discharge employes who chose to
support the union; it did give notices of termination of
employment to" A driver who stated that "he was probably
going to have""to stay with the union" and a driver who
"refused to tell him either way,"S and two other drivers
signed letters prepared by the employer withdrawing their
union authorization. Then the majority employes' freely
chosen representatives visited the employer on August 7,1957,
and sought to begin negotiation of a contract, and the employer announced its refusal "to negotiate with any union."
(By this, the trier of fact could properly understand, the
employer meant what was said: "any union"; that is, any
union whether organizer-dominated or employe-controlled,
and whether international, national or local and independent.) The employer then called a meeting of the drivers
and reiterated its refusal "to recognize a union as a bargaining agent." On the morning of August 8, 1957, eight
of the drivers (including one who had signed a letter withYIn this regard the Dine drivers and defendant's organizer were exercising the rights referred to as follows in the Chavez ease (pp. 203·204
(39] of 52 CaUd): "Section 1119, fitting the jurisdictional strike leg·
islation into the policy generally enunciated in section 923, cautions that
'Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to interfere with collective
bargaining 'l£bject to the prohibiti0n8 herein ,et forth, nor to prohibit
any individual 1I0lu'IItarily becoming or remaining a member of a labor
organization, or from personally requesting any other indiTidual to join
a labor organization.' (Italics added.) Again, it must be noticed, the
Legislature carefully preserves the basic elements of collective bargaining
wldcll are declared in section 923 to be the policy of the state, including,
of course, the specifically mentioned right of self·organization to that
end, but makes it clcar that the exercise of the right to bargain collectively
is 'subject to the prohibitions herein set forth' and that such limitations
do not 'prohibit any individual 1I01untarily becoming or remaining a
member of a labor organization, or from personally requesting any other
individual to join' (italics added) the organization, a right such as that
which was upheld in In re Porterfield (1946), ••. 28 CaUd 91 [168
P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675]."
'This sort of coercion against the employes' selecting the union of
their choice as bargaining representative was as contrary to the statutory
policy of this state 8S was the converse sort of coercion condemned in
Betail Clerks' U",ion v. Superior Oourt (1959), 81£pra, 52 Cal.2d 222,
224, and Gannon v. San Diego Bldg. Trade, Coutt.cil (1958), 81£pra, 49
Ca1.2d 595, 606·609, i.e., union coercion designed to force an employer to
compel his employes to accept union representation which the employes
have not freely chosen.
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drawing his authorization to the union) met in the union
offices and unanimously voted to strike. The strike and picketing then began.
At this point my view of the evidence (which is that of
the trial court) differs from that of the majority. Here it
should also be mentioned that this case originated in a trial
court; that such court did see and hear witnesses testify;
and that from its vantage point it found facts which fully
support its orders. It is the duty of a reviewing court to
approach its task imbued with a willingness to respect and
support the law; to indulge all presumptions in favor of
the regularity of the proceedings below and to examine the
evidence only to find if there be any which the trial court
could weigh and find sufficient. c, The only conflict may be
the opposing inferences deducible from uncontradicted probative facts." (Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1946),
28 Ca1.2d357, 359 [3] [170 P.2d 465].) "In reviewing the
evidence . • • all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the
respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It is an elementary .•.principle of law, that when a verdict is attacked
as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins
and ends with a determination as to whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which
will support the conclusion reached by the jury. When two
or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts,
the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court." (Crawford v. Southern
Pacific Co. (1935), 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [45 P.2d 183]; see
also Powell v. Pacific Electri.c Ry. Co. (1950), 35 Cal.2d 40,
41-42 [216 P.2d 448] ; Callahan v. G"ay (1955), 44 Cal.2d
107, 111 [2, 3] [279 P.2d 963].) "The rule quoted is as
applicable in reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when
considering a jury's verdict." (Estate of Bristol (1943), 23
Cal.2d 221,223 [2] [143 P.2d 689].) Furthermore, this court
no longer ago than 1956, in Bailey v. County of Los Angeles,
46 Ca1.2d 132, 137 [3, 4, 5] [293 P.2d 449], unanimously
reiterated the holding of Murray v. Superior Court (1955),
44 Ca1.2d 611, 619 [6, 7, 8] [284 P.2d 1], that" [3] 'An
appellate court will not disturb the implied findings of fact
made by a trial court in support of an order, any more than
it will interfere with express findings upon which a final
judgment is predicated. [4] When the evidence is conflict-
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ing, it will be presumed that the court found every fact
necessary to support its order that the evidence would justify.
[5] So far as it has passed on the weight of the evidence, its
implied findings are conclusive. This rule is equally applicable
whether the evidence is oral or documentary.' "
In contrast, the majority today approach the issue of fact
as follows: "If .the Association was 'interfered with, dominated or controlled' by plaintiff, it is not a 'labor organization' within the meaning of section 1117 aud there has been
110 jurisdictional strike within the meaning of section 1118.
The determination of this issue is crueial to defendant's appeal from the order granting a preliminary injunction against
defendant's strike. In deciding that issue we must first interpret the terms 'interfered with, dominated or controlled'
and then in the light of our interpretation determine whether
plaintiff sustained its burden of proving that the Association
is a labor organization." (P. 459 [3], ante.)
If we approach consideration of the above related evidence
with fair and open minds and obedient to the rules previously
established by this court and quoted above, it at once appears that the above described .. coercion" of the employer
designed to induce the drivers not to be represented by defendant or any union, need not be understood as "interference" with the subsequently organized Independent Association of Petri Employees. There is no evidence that the
employer entered into a compact with any "organizer"
agreeing to require the employes to join the organizer's association or any other group or suffer dismissal from employment. There is no evidence whatsoever that anyone had
spoken of a company or independent union before August 8,
when the strike and picketing began. It was only after the
strike was under way that Charles Bard (hired as a supervisor on August 8) and Dan Burns (the one driver who had
not authorized defendant union to represent him and who
thereafter refused to join the Independent Association) spoke
with representatives of the employer concerning the formation of an inside union.
Roland Matthews, the Petri employe who organized the
Independent Association, testified that three or four weeks
after the strike began he became interested in forming such
an association because he heard from a Bowen employe (see
majority opinion, p. 463, footnote 4) that the formation of
an independent association at that plant had resulted in the
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settlement of a labor dispute there; Matthews and other
Petri employes felt that "the situation was a deadlock" and
he wished "to get the plant settled down and get over the
tension"; therefore, Matthews inquired of the employer's
manager whether "Mr. Petri would go along with an independent association or organi7.ation and negotiate a working
agreement" and Petri st.ated that he would do so but "he
[Petri] could have nothing to do with it, which I [Matthews]
knew he couldn't." Thereafter Matthews took no further
action concerning the formation of the Association until December, 1957.
Although the evidence as to the genesis of the Association
would support a finding that the employer" interfered" with
it, in the sense of encouraging it, it does not appear to me
that such a finding is as a matter of law compelled or that
the contrary finding of the trial court is unsupported. The
trial court could-and, if we follow the law we have often
declared in other types of cases, we must presume didbelieve that the testimony of Bard and Matthews as to statements of Petri and other representatives of management
that they could have nothing to do with the formation of an
independent organization indicated the intent of management
not to interfere. It could and presumptively did believe that
statements of representatives of management, made after the
strike and picketing had begun, that Petri approved of and
would recognize an inoependent organization were not made
as encouraging ("interfering" with) its formation and did
not have the effect of "dominating" or "controlling" the
employes, but were made for the purpose of letting the
employes know that despite Petri's long history of expressed
antagonism toward unions-any unions and all unions-he
was now coming to the point where he would not oppose
the formation of an independent union or labor organization
or insist that the employes who attempted to organize it
must choose between employment with Petri and such organizational activity. The First Amendment protects the
employer's right to noncoereive expression of its views on
labor policies and problems. (NoHonol Labor Rc1ation.~ Boord
v. Virginia Electric & PO'l'cr 00. (1941), 314 U.S. 469, 477
[62 8.Ct. 344, 86 L.Ed. 348]; National Labor Relations
Board v. Ford Motor Co. (1940, C.C.A. 6). 114 F.2d 905,
913-9]5 [12-19], rert. den. 312 n.s. 689 [61 8.Ct. 621, 85
ILEd. 1126].)
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In December, 1957, Matthews began active organizational
efforts. He again sought and received the assurance of Petri
that there would be no discrimination against employes who
participated in an "independent union." The only direct
evidence that any representative of management gave
Matthews any aid during his activities which led up to the
organizational meeting of January 8, 1958, is the testimony
of Bard, a supervisory employe, that at Matthews' request he
recommended the names of two drivers who might assist in
the formation of the Association.
The testimony that on January 8 representatives of management "instructed the drivers . . . that if the work was
finished they could be in by 4 :00 that day" in order to
attend the meeting- does not compel an inference of company
domination. (See Ottli1i4ry Alliance etc. Union v. Beasley
(1955), 135 Cal.App.2d 186, 193 [5] [286 P.2d 844].) The
testimony that representatives of management walked about
and watched the meeting place and "checked" a nearby pool
hall "in case that there was any trouble, any violence," does
not necessarily indicate the employer's improper support
of the formation of the Association; it could also indicate
that the employer did anticipate and wished to forestall
possible "trouble" or "violence." That "trouble" or "violence" might come from defendants was not an unreasonable
fear.
The events after the organizational meeting of January 8
do not compel inferences of management-inspired haste and
lack of full and free participation by the employes in the
obtaining of the recognition agreement of January 9 and
the contract negotiated between the Association and the employer on January 16. There is evidence that employes were
anxious to have the pickets removed from the plant. It is
also significant that Meader, a perSOll experienced in labor
organization problems and not connected with the employer,'
was engaged by Matthews, consulted with him and other
employes, and aided in the conduct of the organizational
meeting. (See Voeltz v. Bakers etc. U11imt (1953), 40 Ca1.2d
382, 386 [2] [254 P.2d 553].) It is to be observed also that
the Voeltz case upheld a preliminary injunction under the
Jurisdictional Strike Law in a situation similar to the present
-Meader bad previously done some investigath'e and pbotostatic work
for plaintiff's attorney in respects not conneeted with this matter, but
they had no contact in connection with the formation of the Association.
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one in that the contest for jurisdiction was between an international union, together with its local affiliates, and an
independent employes; association which had been formed
behind picket lines after tbe affiliates of the international
union had picketed for 11 months in an attempt to enforce
their demand for acceptance byplaintiti employer and a
commitment by him to compel his employes to join and pay
dues to the demanding union.
It thus appears to me that, viewed by rules which are
presumed to govern reviewing courts (and which were respected by the District Court of Appeal in its unanimous
decision, reported (1959, Cal.App.) 340 P.2d 731, 735-738),
the evidence fully supports the trial court's :finding that in
January, 1958, the drivers then employed by Petri formed
a labor organization which was not "financed in whole or
in part, interfered with, dominated or controlled by the employer" within the meaning of section 1117 of the Labor
Code. Such a determination, upon a preliminary injunction,
is of course not a determination of the merits of the controversy. (People v. Black's Food Store (1940), 16 Ca1.2d
59,62 [105 P.2d 361].) Nor is the trial court's denial of the
temporary injunction sought by the union a :final determination of that aspect of the controversy.
The union's contention that upon the assertedly undisputed
facts the trial court should presently grant it affirmative relief by preliminary injunction requiring the employer to
recognize and bargain with the union and disestablish the
Association is not wen taken. The facts of the controversy
have not been fully explored. "The granting of a mandatory
injunction pending the trial, and before the rights of the
parties in the subject matter ,vhicb the injunction is designed to affect have been definitively ascertained by the
chancellor, is not permitted except in extreme cases where
the right thereto is clcarly established and it appears that
irreparable injury will flow from its refusal." (Hagen v.
Beth (1897),118 Cal. 330, 331 [50 P. 425].)
Upon the evidence before it, the trial court's denial of
the preliminary injunction sougllt b)r the demanding union
may well have been based upon a proper determination
that there was no showing that irreparable injury would
result from denial of such pendente lite relief. Indee(l, a
•wise discretion would appear to requiJ·e denial of such relief

..
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at this stage of the proceedings. (Santa Cruz F. B. Assn.
v. Grant (1894), 104 Cal. 306, 308 [37 P. 1034] ; Lagunitas
W. Co. v. Marin Oounty W. 00. (1912), 163 Cal. 332, 336
[125 P. 351].)
This matter should be fully tried upon the merits so that
it can be finally determined whether the group of driver
employes who formed the Association in January, 1958, did
so free of employer interference; whether the group of driver
employes whose majority signed union authorizations in the
summer of 1957 did so voluntarily; and whether the employer in violation of sections 921 through 923 of the Labor
Code discharged union men and refused to continue the
employment of drivers who joined the union, or whether the
employer's refusal to recognize the union in August, 1957,
was permissible refusal to submit to demands which were
unlawful under Garmon (1958), Sllpm, 49 Ca1.2d 595, Chavez
(1959), supra, 52 Cal.2d 162, and Retail Clerks' Union
(1959), supra, 52 Ca1.2d 222. Until such facts are ascertained I am not prepared to say what right, if any, of the
union t{) affirmative relief may be developed.
However, it is my opinion, speaking generally, that Rince
section 923 of the Labor Code commits the state to a public
policy of "protecting collective bargaining" (Chavez v. Sargent (1959), supra, 52 Cal.2d 162, 179 [9], 186 [13]; In
re Porterfield (1946), supra, 28 Ca1.2d 91, 119 [29]; Shafer
v. Registered Pharnwcists Union (1940), 16 Cal.2d 379, 385
[3] [106 P.2d 403]), workmen who have freely designated
a bargaining representative by voluntary majority selection
have legal "rights of collective bargaining" which can hp.
protected and enforced by appropriate equitable decree at
the suit of such representative (Ohavez v. Sargent, supra,
pp. 193, 205-206 [46,47]; Silva v. Jfercier (1949), 33 Ca1.2d
704,706 [1], 707 [2] [204 P.2d 609] ; Elsi.s v. Evans (1958),
157 Cal.App.2d 399, 409-410 [2, 1b] [321 P.2d 514]; see
Wnliams v. International etc. of Boilermakers (1946), 27
Ca1.2d 586, 590 [2] [165 P.2d 903]).
The majority say that recognition and enforcement of such
right would improperly require the trial court •• to sit as a
labor board and thus determine the appropriateness of bargaining units, conduct elections, certify the majority representative, and direct collective bargaining," all without specific statutory guidance. But courts are required daily to
decide questions in complicated fields in which the particular
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judge may not have the particular expertise,lO and in which
the particular rules may not have been developed, which
are to be expected, for example, in the case of an administrative board or of a judge who sits for a substantial period
of time in a specialized department. Such difficulties (or
the difficulties that may result because different trial judges
of the same court may have sharply differing views of the
law which is applicable to the field; see Horwin, The Labor
Re"latwns Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court
(1942), 31 Cal.L.Rev. 16) are not reason for announcing as
a principle of law that rights inevitably flowing from a
legislative declaration of policy and general rules cannot be
enforced.
Nor does it appear that the lack of definition or explanation by the California Legislature of such matters as what
constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit,11 or who are
1·The following eases are mentioned merely by way of example: Mandatory injunctions requiring exceedingly complicated acts directed in com·
paratively simple terms have been affirmed and contempt decrees for thcir
violation upheld. (E.g., People v. City of Lo8 .&ngele8 (1948), 83 Cal.
App.2d 627 [189 P.2d 489]; City of Vernon v. Superior Coon (1952),
38 Ca1.2d 509 [241 P.2d 243]; and City of Cul1!er City v. Superior Court
(1952), 38 Ca1.2d 535 [241 P.2d 258] [the Hyperion sewage plant
cases].) In water rights cases this court has urged the trial courts to
devise injunctive physical solutions of complex problems, and has pointed
out that a court of equity is not limited by the suggestions of the parties
and has broad powers to work out a just solution of the case. (Tulare
Irr. Dist. v. Lind8ay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. (1935), 3 Cal.2d 489, 574
L54] [45 P.2d 972]; Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938),11 Cal.2d
501,560 [25] [81 P.2d 533].)
In Oklahoma v. Texas (1920), 252 U.S. 372 [40 S.Ct. 353, 64 L.E(I.
619]; id. (1921),256 U.S. 607 [41 S.Ct. 540,65 L.Ed. 1116]; id. (1923),
261 U.S. 340 [43 S.Ct. 379, 67 L.Ed. 687]; id. (1923), 262 U.S. 50;;
[43 s.m. 701, 67 L.Ed. 1094]; id. (1924), 264 U.S. 565 [44 S.Ct. 455,
68 L.Ed. 852]; id. (1924), 265 U.S. 76, 490, 493, 500, 505, 513 [44 S.Ct.
457, 68 L.Ed. 908], the United States Supreme Court, through a receiver and commissioners, not only surveyed lands and established boundary Jines, but also drilled oil wells (including some dry holes) and produced oil and gas.
In situations luch as the foregoing, the courts went about their business
of attempting to lolve problems by application of the judicial process
despite the fact that (it may be assumed) they were without particular
expert knowledge in the fields of sewage disposal, protection of water
resources, or oil and gas production.
"It may be mentioned that Congress did not tell the National Labor
Relations Board what constituted an appropriate bargaining unit. Rather,
it. told the board to decide "whether, in order to insure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising rights guaranteed by this [National Labor
Relations Act, as amended] ..., the unit appropriate for the purpose of
collective bargailli:ng shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit,
or subdivision thereof," and made only three specific provisions in this

)

)

494

PETRI CLEANERS, INC. V. AUTOMOTIYE
EMPLOYEES, ETC., LOCAL No. 88

[53 C.2d

employes eligible to vote in an election to select a bargaining
representative12 (see quotation from majority opinion as to
this "host of problems," ante, pp. 478-479), present insoluble
difficulties. In this connection it may be mentioned that the
eourts of this state dealt for many years with questions of
labor relations without statutory guidance as to what constituted a "labor organization" or "union," bona fide or
otherwise; they have never had any statutory guidance as to
who is a "union organizer," authorized or unauthorized;
in the 1930's the term "collective bargaining" appeared in
a number of statutes (e.g., in addition to Lab. Code, § 923,
in Lab. Code, §§ 222, 224, 554) without any statutory information as to the nature of the process or what constitutes 8
valid collective bargaining agreement.
Concerning the problem of conducting a representation
election, it may be said that where the question of employe
representation for collective bargaining purposes is raised
in an action by an employer or union (or, as in this case,
by cross-actions of both), a California court probably cannot,
without some cooperation of at least one of the parties, directly compel them to resort to t.he auspices of an administrative body constituted for the purpose of conducting or
supervising representation elections, for there is in California
no such administrative body specifically required to furnish
regard; i.e., that the board shall not (1) include professional employes
in a unit with nonprofessionals unless a majority of the professionals vote
for inclusion; (2) decide that a craft unit is inappropriate on the ground
that a different unit has been previously established unless a majority of
the employes in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representa·
tion; (8) include company guards in a unit which includes other employes.
(National Labor Relations Act, ~ 9(b); 29 U.S.C.A. (1956), ~ 159(b).)
Naturally, the board has developed expertise as to what bargaining
units work most effectively in various situations, but the federal courts,
without such expertise, are able to pass upon the correctness of its deter·
minations in this regard. (E.g., National Labor Relations Board v.
Hearst Publications (1944), 822 U.S. 111, 182 [64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed.
1170]; Pittsburgh Glass 00. v. National Lobor Relations Board (1941).
318 U.S. 146, 156 [61 S.Ct. !l08, 85 L.Ed.1251).)
"Congress by its 1959 amendment of section 9(c)(8) of the National
Labor Relations Act did not give the board particular statutory guidance
in this regard, but merely a wider ambit for determination, by changing
the rule that •• Employees on strike who aro not entitled to reinstatement
shall not be eligible to vote," to provide that •• Employees engaged in
an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be eligible
to vote under such regulations as the [National Labor Relations] Board
shall find are consistent with the purposp-s and provisions of this Act in
any election eonducted within twelve months after the commencement of
the strike." (29 U.B.C.A. (1956, and 1959 Pocket Part), ~ 159(e) (8).)
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such services at the direction of a court. (See Chavez v.
8argent (1959), supra, 52 Ca1.2d 162, 215 [56].) But the
court can enjoin picketing by a union where it determines
that the object of such picketing is to force the employer
to recognize the union although such union does not represent a majority of the affected employes (and, if the question
arises, that the disaffection of the subject employes for the
picketing union is not the result of their participation in a
company-dominated union). (Lab. Code, §§ 923, 1116-1118.)
Or the court can enjoin the employer from recognizing and
maintaining a company union if it determines that a majority
of his employes would prefer representation by the picketing
union but adhere to the company union for fear of reprisal.
(Lab. Code, §§ 1116, 1117, 1122.) Parties to a labor dispute
faced with recognition of these injunctive powers of the
court would undoubtedly be more willing to cooperate in
working out or accepting a plan for a fair election (see
Chavez v. 8argent, sup"a, pp. 215-216 of 52 Cal.2d, footnote
16), by reference if necessary, or to accept the services of
the State Conciliation Service, a state agency which itself
has no enforcement powers and no specifically enjoined duty
to conduct representation elections (except in limited situations not at this time applicable to private employers), but
which has facilities for and expertise in conducting representation elections where the parties agree thereto and the
number of affected employes is not too great.11
"The State Conciliation Service was created by the director of the
Department of Industrial Relations under section 65 of tbe Labor Code.
That section now provides (Stats. 1949, eb. 568, p. 1058) that the de·
partment "may investigate and mediate labor disputes providing any
bona fide party to such dispute requests intervention by the department
and the department may proft"er its sen-ices to both parties when work
stoppage is threatened and neither party requests intervention. In the
interest of preventing labor disputes the department shall endeavor to
promote sound union-employer relationships. The department may arbi·
trate or arrange for the selection of boards of arbitration on sucb terms
as all of the bona fide parties to such dispute may agree upon .•.. "
As originally enacted (Stats. 1939, ch. 810, p. 2368) section 65 pro·
vided for department intervention only wben "all bona fide parties to
such dispute join in a request for intervention." Concerning such vol·
untary mediation tribunals it was said by Messrs. Matbew 0_ Tobriner
(now Associate Justice of tbe District Court of Appeal, First District,
Division One) and Ricbard S. Goldsmith (then both of the San Francisco
Bar) in "Cooling-Off" and Mediation Stat'utes in tIle States (1947),
20 So.Cal.L.Rev. 264, 272·273, "Tbese tribunals are the Bole agencies
for maintaining industrial peace and safeguarding the rights of labor,
and are not complemented by labor relations acts which are articulated
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In the present case it seems to me, without suggesting
what the trier of fact should find upon the evidence which
may develop, that it might find that the driver employes,
whether or not they constitute the sole possible appropriate
bargaining unit, do constitute an appropriate bargaining

)

by enforcement agencies. To this extent they are seriously handicapped,
regardless of their formal structure or their prescribed procedure."
In its present form section 65 can be given more comprehensive appli·
cation than in its original form; in 1951 (18 Ops. Ca1.Atty.Gen. 216, 218)
Hie attorney general expressed the view that the conciliation service must
investigate and mediate labor disputes when a bona fide party requests
intervention, and has discretion to offer its services when no party reo
quests intervention. Thc conciliation seryice itself is of the view that
"Collective bargainiDg has prospered in California under this principle
[of "voluntarism" adopted in section 65]" (1958 Annual Report of
State Conciliation Serviee, p. 7); however, the conciliation service has
also referred to developments of "compulsion and the exercise of au·
thority through government" in the labor laws of other states and ill
federal legislation, and predicts that "changes ahead may further
shrink the area of voluntarism aud self·government" (id., p. 13).
An example of such" compulsion" is the legislatiVe invocation of tho
conciliation service by the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority
Act (Stats. 1957, ch. 547, amended Stats. 1959, eh. 519). (See (1958) 32
0p8. Cal.Atty.Gen. 25; 1958 Annual Report of State Conciliation Service,
pp. 7,16-17.) The act (§ 3.6(c» (in aecord with the policy declared in
Lab. Code, § 923, and related sections, as construed and upheld in Chavez
v. Sargent) recognizes that "Employees [of the transit authority] shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi·
zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." It requires
lubmission to the conciliation service of any "question whether a labor
organization represents a majority of employees or whether the proposed
unit is or is not appropriate" (§ 3.6(d». Under this legislation the
conciliation service has authoritatively conducted elections and certified
bargaining representatives for the transit authority employes.
Also compulsory collective bargaining, and authoritative designation
of bargaining units, conduct of representation elections, and certification
by the conciliation service for transit district employes are provided for
by the Public Utilities Code (§§ 25051,25052, Stats. 1955, ch. 1036).
Although the conduct of representation elections is not mentioned in
section 65 of the Labor Code, this "common procedure in collective bargaining ..• is applied by the Conciliation Ser... ice" to solve representa'
tion questions in pri ... ate industry. (1951 Annual Report of State Conciliation Service, p. 9.) "The supervision of employee elections by the
State Conciliation Service is by voluntary agreement of all parties in
collective bargaining relationships, actual or potential. . . . The parties
must agree in advance that they will accept and will abide by the results
of the election." (1958 id., p. 14; 1957 id., p. 11.) The use of the offices
of the conciliation service to conduct elections in representation disputes
"implements the policy which is written into the State Labor Code
[§ 923], namely' . . • that the individual workman [shall] have full
freedom of association, self·organization, and designation of representath'es of his own choosing . . . ' " (1956 id., p. 20.) Tllerefore,
judicial enforcement of an agreement between an employer and a union
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unit, and that it could determine (by reference, if necessary)
wh('ther the union, the Association, or neither is the bargaining representative of a majority of that group as to the
time of the institution of this litigation.
This dissent, of course, is not intended to constitute a
criticism of my brothers who comprise today's majority; I
respect them highly. It is, however, an effort to show that
their views on the subject issues are unjustified by law and
undesirable in philosophy, and possibly to assist some future
differently constituted majority, or the Legislature, or the
people by initiative, to take steps that will lead us permanently away from the ungoverned procedures, the uncivilized
actions, all too often including brutal assaults, and the inevitably wasteful results which are inherent in the" free interaction of economic forces" espoused by today's majority.
For the reasons above stated, I would affirm the order granting plaintiff a temporary injunction and denying defendant's
application for a temporary injunction.
Spence, J., and McComb, J., coneurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February
24, 1960. Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

,

for a representation election under the auspices of the conciliation service,
was decreed in California Hotel v. Culinary Workers, San Bernardino
County Superior Court No. 87141 (1956 ia., pp. 37·38). (In Griffin v.
Lima (1954),124 Cal.App.2d 697, 698, 701 [269 P.2d 191], the complaint
of the union alleged tbat sueh an election was held under an agreement
by wbich defendant employers undertook to recognize and bargain with
the union if a majority of the employes designated it as their bargaining
representative, but after a majority of the employes voted to be repre·
sented by the union the employers refused to bargain. The trial eourt
made its minute order providing that" IT]be Union having admittedly
won the election, the defendant.s should now be required to negotiate.
A temjlorary injunction will therefore issue as prayed for in the eom·
plaint." Defenuants' appeal from this minute order was dismissed
berause it was not a final appealable order. The question whether the
agreement could be specifically enforced (e.g., by mandatory injunction
requiring defendants to bargain) was left open.)
It may be mentioned also that, although supervision of a representation
election by the conciliation service "is not a substitute for any legal
obligation which may adhere to any party through State or Federal law,"
the N.L.R.B. recognizes the accuracy of the results of such elections and
:lCeords thcm the same status as elections conducted by the federal board.
(1958 Annual Report of State Conciliation Service, p. 14.)

